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Crisis Leadership: Understanding Good Leadership in Critical Situations 
 





Organizations of all types (private, government and non-profit) and sizes (local, 
regional, national or multinational) will at some point experience a critical situation—a 
crisis. Whether an organization emerges stronger, or at the very least without long-term 
sustained damage, is heavily dependent on the organization’s leadership.  It is 
leadership’s decision-making, the actions they take and oversee, and the environment 
they espouse during critical situations that make up the foundation of most modern day 
crisis response.  In consequence, the ability to lead effectively before, during and after a 
crisis is critical to an organization’s survival.  The purpose, then, of this study is to 
synthesize existing truths about leadership in critical situations and build in an Atlantic 
Canadian context to the literature through the use of local case studies when possible. 
What are the most important qualities, motivations and drivers of successful leadership in 
a crisis and how does it apply in the Atlantic Canadian context? 
In an attempt to answer the above question, this study will summarize relevant 
literature on the topic of leadership in critical situations.  By first outlining the nature and 
impact of crises, the stage will be set for an analytical review of the theoretical 
framework relating to good leadership in non-crisis situations and how those skills can be 
applied in crisis. Then, using local case studies where applicable the functions of and 
challenges to leadership in crises will be analyzed, identifying best practices from which 
managers can draw to better prepare, guide and steward their organizations and also serve 
to enhance systemic crisis management strategies within their organizations, making for a 
better prepared and more resilient organization. 
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“The biggest mistake I ever made” 
 “It’s the biggest mistake I ever made. I regret it to this day. I will always regret 
taking her to the IWK,” said Glen Canning, the father of Rehtaeh Parsons, a 17-year-old 
girl who took her own life in the spring of 2013 (Willick, 2013).  Rehtaeh was allegedly 
sexually assaulted and subsequently cyber-bullied after pictures circulated among her 
peers and classmates at Cole Harbour High School in Cole Harbour, Nova Scotia.  
Canning’s statement to the local newspaper, the Chronicle Herald, on June 7, 2013 was 
referring to his daughter’s stay at 4 South, the IWK Health Centre’s Mental Health 
Inpatient Unit for children and youth across the Maritime provinces (located in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia).  Among Canning’s claims against the IWK: Rehtaeh had been aggressively 
strip searched by male staff on the unit, was discharged before she was ready and had 
learned from other patients in the unit to self-harm.  “They just made it [her depression] 
even worse,” Canning stated of the IWK (Willick, 2013).  
Canning’s claims were made in a very public form, were severely critical of the 
care provided by the IWK to its young mental health patients and had the potential to 
establish severe, long-term financial and reputational damage.  The IWK had to act 
swiftly, smartly, and most importantly, with sensitivity.  Indeed, there had to be a quick 
response regardless of the time and information deficiencies.  In sum, the IWK response 
had to: 





b) adequately address the worried parents of former, current and future patients as 
well as the concerned public, including IWK donors; and, 
c) address the grieving friends and family of Rehtaeh, including Canning.   
This all occurred just days before the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the IWK 
Foundation, the fundraising arm of the IWK, which was in the throes of raising funds for 
a new mental health unit—the timing was critical, to say the least.  What was the 
Executive Leadership Team (ELT), led by President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
Anne McGuire, to do?  It was a crisis.   
The Inevitability of Crisis: Why the Study of Crisis Leadership Matters 
 Organizations of all types (private, government, and non-profit) and sizes (local, 
regional, national, or multinational) either have or will experience critical situations, 
much like the one experienced by the IWK in June 2013.  According to the Institute of 
Crisis Management, there were more than 82,000 newsworthy organizational crises in 
2012, in line with a steady upward trend since 2009 (Institute for Crisis Management, 
2013).  In today’s interconnected world, crises have become a focal point for 
organizations’ business planning in part because of a larger and more connected 
populace; more people are impacted by crises and the speed at which information travels 
and the way in which it can travel has been tantamount in this shift.   Information is 
increasingly being shared in short form, without all of the facts or before the facts are 
known.  Social media has become a primary source for news sharing.  When headlines 
are shared it is often alongside the sharer’s opinion and the opinions of their “friends” or 
“followers.”  Indeed, facts and opinions are becoming more difficult to distinguish, at 
least on the surface.   
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Despite these changes, what has been constant throughout history is that crises are 
inevitable, be it natural or man-made.  Indeed, human error, the unpredictability of 
weather, and economic instability are certainties.  As such, the forward thinking modern 
leader will look to learn how to handle critical situations.  Crises lay siege to an 
organization’s financial wellbeing, reputation, and can destroy the trust an organization 
has with its internal and external stakeholders. Whether an organization emerges stronger, 
or at the very least without long-term sustained damage, is heavily dependent on its 
leadership. 
Research Outline   
 
It is leadership’s decision-making, the actions they take and oversee, and the 
environment they facilitate during crises that forms the foundation of most modern day 
crises (James & Wooten, 2010).  As a result, the ability to lead effectively before, during 
and after a crisis is critical.  This begs the question: what are the most important qualities, 
motivations and drivers of successful leadership in a crisis?  How do these apply in the 
Atlantic Canadian context? 
To answer this question, this study will first outline the nature and impact of 
crises in the modern context.  This will be followed by an outline and assimilation of key 
theories on crises including crisis typology and the state of crisis management as it exists 
today.  The result will be a theoretical framework to provide a foundation for an 
understanding of crisis leadership, provide a nuanced understanding of organizational 
crises in the modern context, and form the theoretical basis to analyze the threats crises 
pose to the organization both during and after the event. 
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The second section of this study will look at leadership in non-crisis situations, 
looking at the functions, qualities, and behaviours that make for successful leadership in 
general—that is, what good leadership looks like in the non-crisis context.  Here, great 
leadership will be defined as leadership that conveys i) passion for; ii) belief in; and iii) 
understanding of the organization’s raison d’être: the leadership triumvirate.  What effect 
does great leadership have on organizational culture in “normal” times—that is, during 
non-crisis operations?  From here, the question of how strong leadership “best practices” 
can be applied to maintain organizational composure in times of crisis.    
The third section of this study will integrate the first two sections, focusing on the 
practical functions of and challenges to leadership in crises.  Local examples of 
leadership in crisis will be analyzed to identify best practices from which managers can 
draw to prepare, guide and steward their organizations, serving to enhance systemic crisis 
management strategies in their organizations, making for a better prepared and more 
resilient organization using local examples and case studies.  The study will conclude 
with an overview of best practices for leadership in critical situations, demonstrating that 
leadership in crises not only matters, but it is key to the organization’s success or failure 
during and after a crisis.
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
The Nature of Modern Crises: Global Impact 
 
Crisis leadership is a relatively new and underdeveloped segment of study in the 
congested literature on leadership.  Crisis leadership began taking shape under Ian 
Mitroff in the 1980’s and continues acquiring palpable interest from academics, business 
leaders and governments (Mitroff Crisis Management, 2013).  Indeed, it is no longer 
local populations or immediate stakeholders that are affected by organizational crises, as 
clearly demonstrated by the global fallout after the terrorist attacks in New York City on 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) and the 2008 financial meltdown in the United States (US); 
both events that reverberated around the globe.  The number of people impacted by 
organizational crises is increasing as populations around the world swell, global trade 
becomes a business norm and technology increases the speed at which information 
travels (Kovoor-Misra & Misra, 2007).  Although globalization is a buzzword that has 
been over- and mis-used, the global impact of many modern crises cannot be ignored by 
today’s leaders. The decisions leaders make and the way in which they manage (or 
mismanage) their organizations through crises impacts the world beyond the executive 
boardroom.  While 9/11 and the 2008 financial meltdown are classic case studies 
demonstrating the interconnectedness and potentially global impact of modern-day crises, 
let us consider a lesser known example.   
Originating in a flat in England, a group of extremists developed and planned a 
plot to detonate liquid-based bombs disguised in beverage bottles on passenger airliners 
headed for North America.  The plot was foiled by British intelligence (MI5) and local 
police in August 2006.  The result was a widespread ban on liquids over 100ml for all 
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carry-on luggage—a ban that still exists today.  Across the Atlantic, a seafood business in 
Nova Scotia was presented with its own crisis: Clearwater Seafoods Limited (henceforth 
referred to as Clearwater) sold live and cooked lobster (a Nova Scotia specialty and a 
multimillion dollar business) packed on ice or with gel packs—both of which were no 
longer allowed as carry-on luggage.  Understandably, many customers did not want to 
pack their dinner in with their checked luggage.  Management at Clearwater had to deal 
with a local retail crisis because of an international security threat originating in an 
apartment in another country.   
Clearwater faced the challenge head-on out of necessity: sales dropped to zero 
immediately after the ban came into effect (Jabbour, 2006).  The following Monday, 
Tony Jabbour, general manager of the retail lobster division, called his staff in for an 
emergency meeting and brainstorming session (Jabbour, 2006).  The outcome?  Peas, 
carrots and cauliflower.  Frozen vegetables passed Halifax International Airport’s 
security screening as well as food safety requirements, keeping the lobsters cold and 
security-friendly.  The challenge Clearwater faced as a result of an international security 
threat had been successfully navigated under Jabbour’s leadership.  Jabbour had 
encouraged his staff to participate in finding the solution and, perhaps more importantly 
as we will note later, Jabbour admitted that there was a problem.  
Organizational Crisis Defined 
 There are many definitions for organizational crisis.  Mitroff defines it as,  
…disasters precipitated by people, organizational structures, economics, 
and/or technology that cause extensive damage to human life and natural and 
social environments.  They inevitably debilitate both the financial structure 





While Mitroff is correct in that many crises do have extreme outcomes such as extensive 
damage to human, natural and social life, it may be more tempered to state, as he does 
with Christine M. Pearson, that a crisis is an event that “imposes severe strain on the 
organization’s financial, physical, and emotional structures…[posing] a threat to the 
organization’s reputation and viability” (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993, p. 49).  Indeed, not 
every organizational crisis is existential.  The Clearwater example was not an existential 
threat.  Indeed, lobster sales at the airport composed of a significant portion of its $4 
million retail revenues, yet this figure only accounts for a small portion of the total $315 
million in revenues Clearwater earned in 2006 (Bratton, 2006).  While the challenge 
Clearwater faced only affected 1.27% of its sales that year, if left unaddressed it may 
have accumulated into a larger crisis.  For instance, without airport retailing (a high-
traffic, visible location with high marketing value) Clearwater may have lost access to 
potential international buyers passing through to their terminals.  Indeed, the airport 
location is valuable as a marketing strategy as well as a revenue source.  Further, if 
competitors found a solution to the problem, Clearwater would lose its airport retail 
revenue altogether whilst other retailers selling fresh product continued on.  Clearwater 
dealt with the problem before it had a chance to accrue into a potentially bigger issue for 
the company.  In dealing with the crisis at an early stage, Clearwater prevented 
potentially larger problems down the road.   
 While not an existential threat, the Clearwater example is more than an 
organizational problem.  Indeed, problems tend to be frequent, affect only a few 
stakeholders, and have an internal focus, whereas a crisis, on the other hand, is rare, 
affects multiple or a significant number of stakeholders and goes beyond the internal 
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impacts (James & Wooten, 2010).  Pearson and Mitroff identify five key aspects that 
distinguish crises from problems:  
a) the impact is of a high magnitude; 
b) there is a need for immediate attention; 
c) there is an element of surprise;  
d) there is a need to take action; and 
e) it is of a nature that is outside the organization’s complete control (Pearson & 
Mitroff, 1993, p. 49).  
Where Pearson and Mitroff tend to focus on the general criteria of a crisis, Erika Hayes 
James and Lynn Perry Wooten point specifically both to the organization’s stakeholders 
and the organization’s internal and external pressure points.  As such, the criteria put 
forward by James and Wooten is more specific to the organization in crisis and thus, 
more useful to the study of crisis leadership:  
a) the event is a rarity; 
b) it is significant;  
c) it affects multiple stakeholders; and 
d) has both an internal and external impact (James & Wooten, 2010, p. 18).  
 
In highlighting the affected stakeholders as well as the internal and external impact, a 
crisis is seen not only as an infrequent traumatic occurrence for the organization, but 
looks at the bigger picture—both inside the organization and out.  James and Wooten put 
forth the notion that true organizational crises are dual pronged in that they have internal 
elements and external elements that leadership must consider when preparing for crisis, 
navigating through the fallout and formulating a response.  In other words, crisis affects 
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multiple stakeholders, meaning that investors, management and consumers are not the 
only stakeholders to be considered in a crisis.  Any combination of government, 
suppliers, political groups, communities, employees, trade unions, the environment or a 
wider economic market could be impacted as well.  As such, “stakeholders” has an 
inclusive definition in the modern study of organizational crisis. 
Threats to the Organization 
The literature indicates widespread agreement that there are three significant 
threats to an organization in crisis.  First, a crisis is an event that imposes severe strain on 
the organization’s resources.  Time, money, supplies and other tangible goods can be 
pumped into the crisis management response to the point that it bankrupts the 
organization.  Secondly, a crisis imposes significant strain on the members of an 
organization, meaning a crisis can be draining on members’ psychological resources.  
Studies show that when in crisis fear, stress, sadness, anger, and anxiety become 
prevalent (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003).  This can create a sense of 
hopelessness leading to a loss in productivity within the organization, increased turnover 
from employees (leaving for less stressful or more secure employment environments), 
and overall disengagement from the organization for any number of reasons including 
disappointment, feelings of betrayal or embarrassment.  In publically traded companies, 
the psychological shock of a crisis often materializes in the stock market, with prices 
falling upon the news of trouble.  Consider, for instance, the listeria outbreak in a Maple 
Leaf Foods plant that saw sales of sliced meats drop by 50% and shares drop by 10 cents, 
leading to a $12.9 million loss in a single quarter on top of the direct costs associated 
with the $25 million recall (Flavelle, 2008).  Although more difficult to measure 
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quantitatively, the psychological impact can be devastating to an organization and should 
not be underestimated by leadership.  Thirdly, a crisis can threaten the reputation of an 
organization, effectively diminishing trust in the brand.  When an organization fails to 
maintain the status quo, if not exceed it, stakeholders can feel a sense of betrayal.  When 
a customer, stakeholder, donor or citizen feels betrayed, this can lead to legal action, 
financial penalization or discontinued support and loyalty. Stakeholders tend to ask how 
“people who have risen to positions of leadership lack[ed] the foresight, judgement, [or] 
character in the face of crisis…feelings [in an organizational crisis] are basically 
attributable to our feelings that the CEO and top management should have taken better 
care of us” (Mitroff, 2007, p. 207).  Indeed, when an organization is hit by crisis, the 
audience critiques how the leadership either should have known better, should have done 
better, or both. 
Crisis Typology  
 Crises can be man-made or natural, intentional or unintentional, accidental or 
malicious.  Tracing the roots of a crisis is helpful in formulating the solution and 
developing a strategy for preventing a similar event, or at the very least enabling an 
organization to be more prepared should the event occur again.  The most thorough list of 
crises is that developed by W.T. Coombes which provides not only an extensive list of 
crises, but is also divided into crisis types—helpful in that it “differentiates between 
human and technical breakdowns and crises that originate within and outside the 
organization” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 49).  
Table 1.1: Coombs Crisis Types 
Crisis Type Crises 
Natural Disasters Hurricanes; Floods; Tornadoes 
Malevolence Product Tampering 
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Technical Breakdowns Product Recalls 
Human Breakdowns Human Error 
Challenges Discontented Consumers 
Megadamage Oil Spills; Environmental Damage 
Organizational Misdeeds Illegal Activity 
Workplace Violence Aggression 
Rumours Reputational Undermining 
 
While thorough, it is less succinct and user-friendly when compared to Coombes’ matrix 
model which, although more general and simplistic, is more useful in determining the 
primary roots of the crises (Coombes, 1995, p. 455).  Here, the origins are either internal 
or external, intentional or unintentional.  









(i.e.: PG&E knew of 
contaminated water supply in 
Hinkley, California and failed 
to inform residents) 
Accident 
(i.e.: Accidentally selling 
defective product) Internal 
 
Once the type of crises has been determined, the leadership can begin to look at 
and understand what led to the crisis.  This enables an organization to be more reflective.  
In determining the crisis type, leadership can better determine the scale of the damage 
(financial, psychological, and reputational), identify stakeholders who require attention 
and remedial action (the “victims”), how to respond to remedy the situation, and analyze 
the overall performance of the moving parts of the organization and how its internal 
processes functioned prior to and during the crisis, paving the way for improvement 
(Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 51).   
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 Although the merit in crisis typologies is now clear, it is critical to stress that 
crisis typologies have limitations given the dynamic nature of crises.  Matthew W. Seeger 
et. al. note that there are two limitations to crisis typology (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 
2003).  First, crisis types are almost never mutually exclusive and secondly, crises will 
continue to form, emerge and manifest in unexpected ways:  
Natural disasters can take new and unexpected forms, particularly as they 
interact with human technology and development…unforeseen human 
resource challenges will create new crisis forms.  Although crisis typologies 
are very helpful crisis learning and management tools, they cannot predict 
when an event will occur, what specific features it will have, or how the crisis 
will evolve. (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 64) 
 
Crisis Management Today 
Although leaders cannot prevent all disasters, nor predict with absolute certainty 
when, where and how they will happen, Mitroff and Paul Shrivastava argue that 
“organizations can adopt a systemic and comprehensive perspective for managing them 
more effectively” (Mitroff, Shrivastava, & Udwadia, Effective Crisis Management, 1987, 
p. 283).  Mitroff and Shrivastava initially developed a four step crisis management model 
in 1987, when the study of crisis management was beginning to emerge.  This evolved 
into a five phase crisis management model by 1993 under Pearson and Mitroff, working 
more as a cyclical process, reconfiguring the steps to give prominence to the roles of 
preparation and learning in the crisis management framework.   
Table 1.3: Crisis Management Models 1987-Present 
Four Phase Model, 1987-1993 (Mitroff, 
Shrivastava, & Udwadia, Effective Crisis 
Management, 1987) 
Five Phase Model, 1993-Present (Pearson 
& Mitroff, 1993) 
I. Detection: Simulate, disrupt, 
prepare, prevent 
II. Crisis: Proactive, reactive 
response as crisis unfolds to 
contain damage 
I. Signal Detection: Early 
warnings of pending 
crisis/weaknesses 
II. Preparation/Prevention: Crisis 
planning, risk management 
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III. Repair: Recovery, return to 
normal or “new” normal 
IV. Assessment: Learn from I-




Limitation: Proactive, reactive 
response as crisis unfolds 
IV. Recovery: Return to normal or 
“new” normal, short and long 
term recovery initiatives 
V. Learning: Collating, analyzing 
and acting on lessons learned, 
best practices 
 
Pearson and Mitroff’s model puts emphasis on the aim to do as much as possible to detect 
and prevent the crisis, separating detection and prevention, whereas in the earlier model, 
they were considered one and the same.  Here, signal detection requires an organization 
to look for early warning of a pending crisis.  As Pearson and Mitroff note, “[w]ith very 
few exceptions, crises leave a trail of early warning signals” (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993, p. 
53).  This is not to say that these signals are obvious or clearly identifiable.  However, 
under this model, leadership must be willing to look critically at its own processes and 
the surrounding environment to detect these signals and act on them.  The second major 
change in Pearson and Mitroff’s five phase model is the emphasis on learning.  Here, 
assessment is no longer a step in the crisis management process, but rather a constant and 
continuous exercise in each of the phases aimed toward prevention, mitigation and 
learning.  It is important to note that leadership must be careful to avoid scapegoating 
when reviewing the situation; the emphasis “should be on improving future capabilities 
and fixing current problems” rather than looking to place blame (Pearson & Mitroff, 
1993, p. 54).  The focus, then, is on constructive recovery and strengthening—although in 
many cases there will be errors identified and remedial or disciplinary actions taken.  




 It is a common misperception that in a crisis, the leadership—namely the CEO—
should take over all aspects of operational management.  Although leaders must take 
initiative, it is usually a mistake for a leader to take on everything and anything that 
comes across their desk during crisis.  The tasks the leader must oversee may grow, 
however it is their ability and willingness to delegate power within the organization that 
makes a tremendous difference in planning and executing crisis management strategy.  
The CEO should primarily serve as a symbolic figure of core organizational values and 
the primary communicator during the crisis, not necessarily as a micromanager.    
Thierry C. Pauchant et al identify five key areas which require leadership’s 
attention.  This does not mean that leadership is to take action on very element that falls 
within these five categories, but rather, leadership is to serve as the oversight and trouble-
shooter for aspects of the crisis management plan that impact the bigger picture.  These 
five key areas are: strategic efforts (guiding philosophy, overseeing creation of and 
strategy for a crisis management team); technical and structural efforts (collaboratively 
appointing a crisis management team which provides tools for and gives power to 
credible and capable individuals—possibly drawn from outside the organization if the 
necessary skills are absent within the existing management team); evaluation and 
diagnosis efforts, communications efforts; and psychological and cultural efforts 
(symbolic and psychological support and setting tone within and outside the organization) 
(Pauchant, Mitroff, & Lagadec, 1991, p. 212).   
The key role of the CEO, when considering these five key areas, is to provide 
support to those he or she has empowered to act in each area, work with expertise to 
create and operationalize a crisis management team, and serve as a symbol that stands 
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behind the strategy and philosophy for the organization as it makes its way through the 
crisis.  Rather than creating the solutions, the leadership should help ask the right 
questions that clarify and structure the response and recovery.  Leadership should provide 
assurance to concerned employees and stakeholders that there is a plan for the future.  
The CEO acknowledges the broad strokes of that plan to the public and oversees internal 
plans and operations for a coordinated effort that stays on track.  
While it is useful to delineate the functions into pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis 
pockets of time, these functions are not always part of a linear process.  Indeed, the 
necessity for a leader in crisis to be adaptable to changing priorities inherently requires 
that a leader in crisis not be chained to linear processes or old ways of getting things 
done.  While there will always be certain efforts that must come first, such as putting in 
place a crisis management team, many of the other roles will be carried out 
simultaneously or dictated according to the speed and severity at which the crisis unfolds.  
No crisis is exactly the same—time, location, and people change.  Under changing 
circumstances in a crisis adaptability, nimbleness and flexibility are critical.  Perhaps the 
most useful summary of this notion of flexibility and adaptability comes from Sun Tzu: 
“The highest skill in forming dispositions is to be without form; formlessness is proof 
against the prying” (Sun-Tzu, 2009, p. 37).  However, changing what works is not the 
solution.  Indeed, it can hinder recovery, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Two: Good Leadership and Critical Situations 
Leadership in Crisis: An Argument Against Reinventing the Wheel 
Tanya Prive, Forbes contributor and founder of RockThePost, contends that in 
critical situations leaders tend to focus on what needs to change without highlighting (or 
maintaining) essential constants:  
When money is tight, stress levels are high…it’s easy to let those emotions get 
to you, and thereby your team. Take a breath, calm yourself down, and 
remind yourself of the leader you are and would like to become (Prive, 2012). 
 
Indeed, when times get tough, a leader need not change who they are in the workplace 
nor the ideals and goals they strive for of themselves and for the organization, assuming 
that the leadership is not the culprit in creating the crisis (meaning the leader and the 
executive team’s behavior was not a significant contributing factor nor was their 
decision-making irresponsible, damaging or directly causal).  In other words, Prive 
argues that overhauling one’s leadership style in critical situations is neither compulsory 
nor inherent.  To determine if the crisis requires change, Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. 
Sutcliffe suggest leaders should take “audits” in critical situations that serve as “mindful 
moments…in contexts that are dynamic, ill-structured, ambiguous, or unpredictable” 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 85).  Leaders in critical situations must stop and take a 
moment to review the situation and their role in it moving forward; changing what was 
working before a crisis is not necessarily going to contribute to the solution and way 
forward during a crisis—in fact, it may delay recovery.   
Weick and Sutcliffe highlight deference to expertise, calling for the migration or 
expansion of decision-making to experts within or outside the organization rather than 
completely transforming the decision-making structure within the organization (Weick & 
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Sutcliffe, 2007).  They argue, then, for minor tweaks depending on what the situation 
calls for.  As situations and priorities shift throughout a crisis, the leader must review the 
relevant available information, adding additional support to pre-existing strengths as 
required.  For example, if the communications team was already strong before the crisis, 
there is no need to shift press release writing to the executive office.  Rather, the release 
may include a quote from the executive office or be released on behalf of or from the 
executive office, but the expertise in the communications team may very well suffice in 
formulating the messaging. 
In crisis, a leader must not betray organizational beliefs, values and principles 
(again, under the assumption that they are not causal factors in the crisis to begin with).  
However, if it is the case that the challenges being faced are a result of misguided or ill-
fitting beliefs, values or principles, a crisis may “represent [the] best opportunity to make 
major changes in [the] organization because they lessen the resistance [to change] that 
exists in good times” (George, 2009, p. 12).  Regardless of whether a critical situation 
calls for steadfastness or major organizational changes, employee commitment is 
essential; leadership, particularly the CEO, greatly influences employee loyalty and their 
decision to fight or take flight. 
The CEO as the Connector 
While priorities may continually shift, leadership should always be concerned 
with and have their finger on the pulse of three crucial aspects of the organization:  
a) the financial health of the organization; 
b) the vitality of the mission and vision; and, 
c) finally, the relational aspects of the workplace, including setting the tone for 
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the organization’s culture.   
While day-to-day challenges may bring different foci to the attention of the CEO, the 
three key areas mentioned above should be constant priorities during both normal 
operations and critical situations.  The people who carry out the work on the ground and 
the connection they have with the organization’s vision and mission largely determines 
an organization’s efficiency, functionality, productivity and thus, profitability.  In sum, 
employee loyalty is important before a crisis to be strong during a crisis.   
Relating to the CEO’s role in setting the tone for organizational culture, consider 
that employees “must be tied to larger organizational ambitions. Employees who don't 
understand the roles they play in [the company’s success] are more likely to become 
disengaged” (Gallo, 2011).  Indeed, perhaps one of the most basic tenets of leadership is 
an understanding of the importance of united action driven by belief in a central vision.  It 
follows that the role of the leader is to represent the spirit of the organization through 
their words and actions.  As guardian of the organization’s mission and vision, the 
leadership can enhance or diminish the worker’s desire to connect with and support that 
organization’s vision.  The CEO, then, is the connector—the catalyst between the 
employees and the organization’s mission.  They can foster loyalty to the organization 
that, in times of crisis, is invaluable. 
The connecting role of the CEO is demonstrated at Ambir Solutions (henceforth 
referred to as Ambir), an IT company with offices in Quebec, New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  Fredericton employee Michael George has a son who 
was diagnosed with cerebral palsy, epilepsy and developmental delays requiring semi-
annual checkups amounting to approximately three days per visit at the IWK.  Citing it as 
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a “non-issue,” Ambir accommodated George with flextime so he did not have to use his 
valuable vacation days. (Martin, 2010).  As a result, George did everything he could to 
eliminate a reduction in his billable hours, his son received the care he needed, and Ambir 
in turn was rewarded with loyalty, hard work and “solid financial results.” (Ambir 
Solutions, 2012; Martin, 2010).  In April 2013 Ambir, led by CEO Ian Cavanagh, was 
recognized both regionally and nationally as an excellent place to work (Industry News, 
2013).  Cavanagh believes in treating his people with respect and building trust.  As a 
result, employees have been found to “trust management, have pride in their jobs, and 
enjoy the people they work with...[and] care about their work, their organization, and 
their community” [emphasis added] (Industry News, 2013). 
While Cavanagh is clearly a well-liked and respected leader, revered by his 
employees or “team members” as he refers to them, many successful leaders are not 
necessarily renowned for their winsome personalities.  Yet, these less agreeable 
personalities have employees that are proud to work for the organization under their 
tenure.  Consider former Apple CEO Steve Jobs.  Jobs was well known for his hot temper 
and insensitivity to those around him but was incredibly successful as a leader, with 
Apple turning record profits and consistently landing on Forbes’ list of Most Admired 
Companies under his leadership (Isaacson, 2011).  Although Jobs was the subject of 
criticism for being hostile, Apple is by and large considered a desirable place to work 
(CNN, 2012; Dennings, 2012).  Here, we have an example of a CEO creating an 
intellectually stimulating environment that inspires loyalty and commitment like Jobs, 
rather than a people-oriented and considerate environment like Cavanagh created at 
Ambir.  As such, it can be concluded that leadership is not dependent on having an 
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agreeable or people-oriented personality.  Rather, it is the leader’s ability to connect 
employees with the organization’s cause.  Jobs and Cavanagh are two very different men 
with two very different leadership styles, and yet, both companies are financially viable, 
have strong leadership directing the mission, and a largely connected and engaged 
employee base.  Both CEOs successfully connected their employees to the mission and 
created environments that fostered teamwork, loyalty and respect using transformational 
leadership, albeit very different elements of transformational leadership.  Jobs and 
Cavanagh demonstrate that leadership is not about who you are so much as what, why 
and how you do it—a conclusion that can be traced through the evolution of the study of 
leadership.   
What is Good Leadership? A Brief Overview on the Evolution of Leadership Theory 
The understanding and study of leadership and what makes for a strong leader has 
greatly evolved since the turn of the 19th century.  Among the first theories to emerge was 
the “Great Man” theory, where physical characteristics determined leadership ability.  
Tall, dark, handsome and male were characteristics widely believed to be correlated with 
good leadership (Barling, Christie, & Hoption, 2011).  By the 1940’s the behavioral 
attributes of leaders were considered, of which there were two main archetypes: 
initiating structure (task-focused personalities keen on processes) and consideration 
(people-focused personalities keen on relationship building).  Fred E. Fiedler argued that 
these two types, when viewed as independent of each other, were riddled with 
“inconsistencies which…demanded an integrative theoretical formulation,” signifying 
that effective leadership was dependent on the situation—different situations demanded 
different styles of leadership for the best outcome (Fiedler, 2004, p. 369).  By the 1970’s, 
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the study of leadership began to look beyond the leader, focusing on the role of the 
employee.  This led to the rise of the path-goal theory, postulating that success is 
determined by aligning employees with the organization’s goal.  This was further 
explored under the leader-member exchange theory (LMX), where organizational 
success is determined by the interaction between leadership and employees.  Here, 
leadership’s role here is largely centered on the encouragement of employee 
participation, clear directives and support (Barling, Christie, & Hoption, 2011).   
Most modern leadership theories draw largely on the dyadic, interactive approach 
of mutually supportive and collaborative relationships between the leader and employees.  
Noting the importance of the CEO as the connector, how can the leader motivate 
employees and connect them to the cause?  Transformational leadership is often cited 
as the answer, whereby the leader: 
a) emulates idealized influence, leading by example; 
b) provides inspirational motivation, fostering commitment through symbolism, 
communication and the development of interpersonal connections; 
c) encourages intellectual stimulation, consistently asking employees to exceed 
the status quo; and 
d) provides individualized consideration, paying attention to the personal and 
professional needs of employees as much as is practical (Bass, 1990). 
The LMX and transformational leadership theories have been identified as the most 
popular theories relating to leadership today (Barling, Christie, & Hoption, 2011).  Both 
of these theories identify the importance of a high degree of interplay between leaders 
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and employees, with the transformational leadership theory building on LMX by fleshing 
out the vehicles of employee engagement. 
Although a modern buzzword, the concept of transformational leadership dates 
back several thousand years.  It can be found in Sun Tzu’s the Art of War.  Here, a good 
leader is described as: 
a) capable of earning and retaining the good faith and confidence of 
followers in the organization’s vision ultimately leading to a united 
force (inspirational motivation);  
b) maintains a fair balance between discipline and compassion 
(individualized consideration);  
c) has knowledge of the terrain and the organization’s direction 
(intellectual stimulation) and is able to clearly communicate and 
demonstrate that knowledge and why it is the right direction for the 
group (idealized influence), and;  
d) finally, has and oversees a knowledge-based strategy to guide the 
organization and the people within it (Sun-Tzu, 2009).    
Adding to transformational leadership, Sun Tzu notes the importance of strategy and 
planning in the last point, as per above.  Thus, there is an added element to consider in the 
leadership paradigm.  Leadership must have a solid strategy that will operationalize and 
guide transformational leadership.  This strategy is rooted in and guided by a strong 
mission statement and aspirational vision that makes sense in the organization’s structure, 
is inspirational to the employees within the organization, and marketable outside the 
organization.      
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The Leadership Triumvirate: Passion Capital, True Believers, and the “Why” 
While inspirational motivation, individualized consideration, intellectual 
stimulation, idealized influence, and a solid strategy are key vehicles for employee 
engagement vis-à-vis transformational leadership, there is a foundation that is required to 
do great leadership, to be inspirational, to have idealized influence.   These key elements 
of transformational leadership need fuel; I propose that a leadership triumvirate provides 
the fuel for that action.  Specifically I posit that the leadership triumvirate i) passion for; 
ii) belief in; and iii) understanding of the organization’s raison d’être.  The leadership 
triumvirate will be deconstructed as “passion capital,” “true believers,” and the “why,” 
respectively.  These three pillars will be further analyzed by comparing two case studies 
that cover the time before, during and after a crisis.  One example will illustrate an 
instance when the leadership triumvirate was present as a complete whole, the other when 
it was not.  These case studies are the Hurricane Juan response by the Canadian Red 
Cross (CRC) in Atlantic Canada and Invisible Children’s Kony 2012 campaign.   
Passion Capital 
Coined by Paul Alofs in 2012, passion capital is,  
…the foundation upon which all other forms of capital are built.  With 
passion capital you can acquire the others.  Expressed as a formula, passion 
capital looks like this: Passion Capital = Energy + Intensity + Sustainability 
(Alofs, 2012, p. 7). 
 
Energy for the mission, intensity in the focus, and sustaining passion are the elements that 
make up passion capital.   For one to stick with something and see it through there has to 
be, according to Alofs, passion capital.  Business is a series of inputs that are transformed 
into outputs that turn a profit, which is then reinvested into the next series of inputs and 
outputs.  When passion capital is present, it is about more than inputs and outputs.  
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Passion capital converts inputs and outputs into an intense and sustained drive to see the 
realization of the best outputs possible.     
 Passion capital is underpinned by persistence.  Hard work, trial and error, 
rejection, and patience are not easy to withstand without a passion for the outcome.  As 
such, success is not generally a result of beginner’s luck.  Malcolm Gladwell advocates 
for the 10,000-hour rule, whereby excellence is not so much a result of genius or one 
brilliant idea in isolation but intelligence enough to seize an opportunity and possessing 
the work ethic to make it a reality (Gladwell, 2008).  Consider hockey prodigy Sidney 
Crosby.  Winning his first Stanley Cup at 22 years old, he was the first draft pick overall 
in 2005 upon being eligible for the National Hockey League (NHL).  Described as 
“extremely driven, extremely competitive” by his Pee Wee Coach Paul Mason, Crosby 
spent hours shooting pucks at the family washing machine, perfecting his shot (Reebok, 
2010).  A natural talent without a doubt; however, Crosby’s legendary status as “the Next 
One” did not come without years of daily practice on and off the ice and team work in 
practice and games to help the Penguins reach the pinnacle of hockey.  Indeed, luck and 
genius are only so useful as the willingness and work ethic—the passion capital it takes—
to turn the right corners.  Turning those right corners requires hard work.  For those born 
into wealthy families but with more ambition than to be satisfied watching interest 
accumulate, they too will find they are no exception; turning the corners to build on an 
empire requires hard work.  Taking a step back, it takes passion (sustained energy and 
intensity) to seek out those corners which one must turn to realize success.  It also takes a 
belief in what one is trying to accomplish.  
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The True Believer 
Although very different in many respects, leaders of mass movements and leaders 
of organizations must captivate and recruit followers; they must be peddlers of hope for a 
bright future, and give those they take into the fold a sense of “chosen-ness” (Hoffer, 
1989).  As such, being a part of a movement has many parallels to being a part of a 
winning workforce: both significantly benefit from a leader who inspires loyalty and 
motivates action.   Key elements of Eric Hoffer’s work on the nature of mass movements 
can be applied in the context of employee loyalty and motivation.  Consider that Hoffer 
cites the “elements of pride, confidence and purpose [followers feel] by identifying with 
the efforts, achievements and prospects” of the collective (Hoffer, 1989, p. 13).  The 
winning workforce that exceeds the status quo is not begotten of carrots and sticks.  The 
leader of an organization, like the leader of a mass movement, must nurture and support 
ideologically driven followers who want create success and want to be a part of the 
organization’s success.  Indeed, ideology rather than money creates a stronger bond.  This 
is not to say that financial reward is not important.  Indeed, salary quantitatively 
represents an employee’s value.  However, as demonstrated in the example of Michael 
George and Ambir, how employees are treated matters.  As demonstrated at Apple, a 
leader like Steve Jobs who embodies and vehemently watches over an organization’s 
aspirational vision inspires and encourages ideologically driven followers to fight for the 
organization and what it stands for.  This will help prevent employee turnover in times of 
crisis. 
Jack Welch, CEO of General Electric from 1981 to 2001, oversaw a five-fold 
increase in revenue during his leadership.  When asked how he did it, Welch credits his 
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authenticity; his genuine belief in what he and his employees were doing.  Welch stresses 
the impact of a leader’s authenticity,  
Values are a funny thing in business…But they’re meaningless if leaders 
don’t live and breathe them.  Your team and bosses come to know who you 
are in your soul, what kind of people you attract and what kind of 
performance you want from everyone.  Your realness will make you 
accessible; you will connect and you will inspire. You will lead (Welch & 
Welch, 2013). 
 
To be authentic, the leader must truly believe that what the organization is doing will 
result in success.  Toting values and offering up inspirational speeches are of limited use 
without action; the kind of authenticity Welch speaks of requires the CEO to say what 
they mean and do as they say.  Not surprisingly, hypocrisy is positively correlated with 
employee turnover.  According to a 2005 study, 
Perceptions of organizational hypocrisy are genuine and have real 
consequences. Acts of inconsistency influence an organization member's 
intention to leave. Practitioners who believe they can ignore "walking the 
talk" because they provide a paycheck should realize their actions can have 
negative ramifications.  The idea that organizational flexibility and goals are 
more important than consistency between perceived management action, 
culture, and rewards needs to be reevaluated in light of these results 
(Phillippe & Koehler, 2005, p. 20). 
 
The true believer needs idealized influence.  Both Jobs and Cavanagh walked their talk, 
and for that they were respected and admired, though for different reasons.  Both 
exhibited authenticity, and employees respected that.  No one went to Jobs for a hug, but 
he ensured an environment that was intellectually stimulating.  Cavanagh is people-
oriented, creating a quid pro quo between the company and its employees.  Both 
strategies—although very different—encourage employee loyalty with action that aligns 
with words.  Idealized influence is authenticity.  Authenticity is about believing the 
meaning of the talk to authentically walk the talk.    
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Nelson Mandela once said, “Money won’t create success, the freedom to make it 
will.”  Leaders who tend to be motivated primarily by other factors (money, prestige, 
accolades) tend to make decisions that are based on short-term outcomes—the price of 
stock or a year-end bonus.  In contrast, the true believer takes the organization to new 
levels of innovation and creativity.  As aforementioned, the CEO always wants to keep a 
finger on the pulse of the organization’s finances and ensure fiscal good health.  In that 
vein, while driving up revenues is the end product, it is not just about making money, but 
also how and why one makes money.  Every organization has a bottom line, but it is the 
satisfaction one finds in what they do and why they do it that brings lasting success.  
Thus, the CEO must find the synergy between passion capital and inspiring true 
believers.  Employees must believe in what they are doing and why they are doing it if 
they are to find ways to make and do things better.  Indeed, counting money does not 
improve efficiency or effectiveness. 
While the ideals, vision and values will attract a potential true believer, true 
believers are usually not hired, but cultivated.  As noted by a Harvard Business Review 
study released in the summer of 2012, while a vision can draw the attention of potential 
employees it does not necessarily keep them (Stafford, 2012).  Today’s worker has easy 
access to a host of other opportunities online and if workers, particularly younger 
workers, “don’t feel like they’re learning, growing and being valued in a job” or not 
“getting ‘the personal attention, mentoring, the coaching [and] the training they wanted’ 
they are likely to look and eventually leave for another opportunity” (Stafford, 2012).  As 
such, the true believer in the context of the organization is more a product of nurture 




A key aspect is formulating loyalty among followers, as discussed above, is 
developing trust.  Trust often comes from an acknowledged set of shared values, which 
leads to a sense of camaraderie and—especially in times of crisis—a “we are in this 
together” mentality.  Articulating those values comes from a clear understanding of what 
Simon Sinek calls the “why” (Sinek, 2009).  Sinek argues that if a leader is able to 
explain the vision the organization striving towards, he or she can inspire, motivate and 
encourage a culture of loyalty.  A common cause gives people something to believe in 
and satisfies a biological need to belong (Sinek, 2009, pp. 49-53).  The overlap between a 
leader of an organization and a mass movement is once again apparent; people by their 
nature are social creatures that want to be a part of something positive and impactful—
something great.  It follows that when a leader can articulate and demonstrate why the 
organization is great, employees will be more inclined to get behind the organization and 
stand behind it in times of trouble, based on a strong pre-existing relationship and group 
mentality.  
In articulating the “why” a leader must remain honest about what is possible and 
the work required to take the “why” from talk to reality.  The “why” must be at the 
centre, tethering “what” is being done within the organization and guiding “how” things 
are done (see Figure 2.1).  While cheerleading is necessary, aspirational messaging 
cannot serve in lieu of realistic planning (“how” things are done) and disciplined 
operations (“what” needs to be done).  Indeed, as important as inspiration, aspirations, 
and values are, the larger volume of an organization’s work and senior management’s 
time resides in the “how” and the “what” (see Figure 2.2).  Hoffer notes that a leader can 
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be too aspirational, leaving the follower (or employee, in this context) to feel as if: “All 
that I am doing, possibly can do, is chicken feed compared with what is left undone” 
(Hoffer, 1989, p. 49).  A CEO must ensure that he or she articulates and promotes the 
“why” and the management team stays focused on ensuring the strategy is smart (the 
“how”) and what is being done is effective and productive (the “what”).   
       








Strategy is a Necessity: An Illustration of the Triumvirate Without Strategy 
As previously mentioned, it was Sun Tzu who articulated the need for strategy in any 
organized group.  Without strategy passion capital, true believers and the “why” are 
predestined shipwrecks sailing on good intent.  To illustrate the importance of strategy, 
consider two non-profits: one international (the Kony 2012 movement led by Invisible 
Children) and one local to Atlantic Canada (CRC Atlantic Chapter’s response to 
Hurricane Juan).  
 Invisible Children 
In March 2012 the non-governmental organization (NGO) Invisible Children, led 
by director and founder Jason Russell, released a video describing the atrocities 
committed by Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army 









soldiers to encourage cooperation, and massacring civilians in the Central African region 
(mainly Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]).  The goal of the 
video was to bring the remote African warlord out of obscurity, making him famous in an 
effort to encourage the US and the United Nations (UN) to take more aggressive action to 
stop Kony and the LRA (Crotty, 2012).  The video became the fastest growing viral video 
of all time, receiving approximately 112 million views in just one week (Grossman, 
2012).  The video was successful in that it did garner widespread international attention.  
On Spring Garden Road, the main shopping district in Halifax, Nova Scotia, telephone 
poles were covered with “Kony 2012” posters, bought through the Invisible Children 
website which was selling Kony 2012 action kits.  Millions of people around the world 
continued to view and share the video online.  Support for Invisible Children was at an 
all-time high.  Indeed, the video brought attention to Kony; however, intense attention 
was also cast on Invisible Children itself, including its cost per dollar raised, its motives, 
and whether a small organization from San Diego had any place interfering with and 
simplifying a complex geopolitical issue that predates Kony.1  Invisible Children was not 
prepared for the attention it was receiving.  The organization’s true believers had released 
an aggressive “why” with passion, but without a strategy for the successes and criticisms 
that would follow.   
Within a few weeks of the video going viral, public opinion quickly shifted from 
accolades to cynicism, with human rights groups, journalists and critics raising questions 
                                                 
1 This is not to say that Kony is not contributor to the atrocities and perilous conditions in parts of the 
central African region.  However, in the 1980s, the imposition of political authority by southern Uganda in 
the north led to several resistance armies, of which the LRA was one.  Today, governance structures are rife 
with corruption and geopolitical issues including the illegal exploitation of natural resources, particularly 
along the Ugandan-Congolese border, are major underpinnings of the conflict.  Kony is one part of a much 
larger and more complicated narrative of which the LRA is a small—albeit horrific—element. 
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about Invisible Children’s accountability structures, particularly as it related to the 
sudden influx of donor funds and what “raising awareness” would really accomplish in 
such a complicated African narrative.  Invisible Children and Russell were accused of 
running a white savior campaign and oversimplifying a very complex regional conflict.2  
In the weeks following the release of the video, Invisible Children went from being a 
relatively small organization based in San Diego to the centerpiece of an international 
controversy.  Invisible Children had no contingency communication plan for the 
controversial video.   Making matters worse, Russell did 17 interviews in 48 hours, 
crossing the country on red eye flights whilst attempting to manage daily operations as 
per his usual schedule (Russell, 2012).  The Kony 2012 campaign was going so fast it had 
run off the rails, finally imploding with Russell having a public meltdown, removing his 
clothing and running around the middle of the street outside of his home in San Diego, 
screaming at passing cars.   
Invisible Children immediately lost credibility, and the organization and its cause 
faded from the spotlight.  In an interview with Oprah Winfrey following his very public 
meltdown, Russell noted that he regretted not “surrendering ‘Kony 2012’ to my 
colleagues,” instead continuing to try to run the show by and large on his own (Russell, 
2012).  Invisible Children was not a small NGO anymore, and Russell refused to adapt to 
the changes the Kony 2012 campaign brought and failed to delegate authority, instead 
trying to take it all on himself.  His belief in the cause was genuine—he was a true 
believer.  He had passion for the cause.  The “why” was clearly articulated (albeit 
oversimplified).  What was missing was a strategy for successful viral cause marketing 
and the willingness to adapt and delegate.   
                                                 





Turning now to a local case study, consider the CRC Atlantic Chapter’s response 
to Hurricane Juan in 2004.  First, it is important to note that Invisible Children is a stand-
alone organization, whereas the Canadian Red Cross Atlantic Chapter has both inherent 
national and international support given the scope of the Red Cross not only across 
Canada, but the world.  Indeed, the support from which CRC Atlantic Chapter can draw 
is vast.  However, as we will see, the Atlantic Chapter ensured that it had the capacity to 
be self-sufficient and self-sustaining should there be a large-scale local call to action.  
Further, the CRC Atlantic Chapter responds to natural disasters, which often come 
without warning and infrequently.  This is similar to the attention Invisible Children 
received in that it was not typical for the organization.  Easily, CRC in Atlantic Canada 
could fall behind and lose local disaster response capacity—but it doesn’t.  Invisible 
Children could have put together a contingency plan for massive success—but it didn’t.  
Both organizations were faced with crises that required immediate response; one 
organization planned and had a strategy, one did not.  As such, this case study makes for 
a relevant comparative analysis on the role of strategy in good crisis leadership.       
Prior to Hurricane Juan, the largest disaster response had been the Halifax 
Explosion of 1917 (Halifax Regional Municipality, 2006).  Indeed, CRC in Atlantic 
Canada had not had a response of that magnitude in nearly 87 years.  With winds in 
excess of 180 kilometers an hour, the Hurricane Juan caused over $100 million in 
damage, with the eye of the Category 2 hurricane passing directly over Halifax, moving 
in towards mainland Nova Scotia.  Houses were ruined, many of the boats along the coast 
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sunk or had been cast on-shore, boardwalks washed away, steel posts bent and massive 
trees snapped, and 100,000 people went days without power, bringing the region to its 
knees (Canadian Press, 2013).  Three lives were lost as a direct result of the storm.  
Moving directly into the response, CRC in Atlantic Canada mobilized a fully trained 
volunteer force—a force larger than what had been needed previously, but had been 
trained and maintained nonetheless for an event much like this.  It did this alone, as 
national support could not immediately get access to the storm-struck region.   
The volunteers were true believers in the cause.  They had passion for the 
cause and the work they were doing.  CRC keeps the “why” in the forefront of all 
training, beginning each training course with an overview of CRC’s vision, mission 
and principles.  However, the bulk of the training moves directly into the “how” 
and focuses on the operations, logistics and human resource management of 
disaster response.  Despite it having been over 80 years since CRC Atlantic had 
been called to action on such a large scale, it maintained volunteer reserves in the 
thousands, constantly recruiting and training volunteers to act in the event of a large 
disaster.  In the end, CRC Atlantic was able to assist 27,000 people, operate 11 
shelters and comforts centres, and successfully manage over 100 volunteers serving 
over 5,000 volunteer hours in an intense 12-day response without immediate 
national CRC assistance (Emergency Measures Organization, 2003; Canadian Red 
Cross, 2003).  This was no small feat for a small regional branch of CRC that 
hadn’t been fully mobilized since the early 1900s.   
 This comparative analysis has illustrated the importance and interconnectedness 
of the leadership triumvirate with strategy, highlighting the importance of pre-planning 
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and strategy in crisis preparation, mitigation and management.  Again, this comparison is 
made with full acknowledgement of the very different crisis types (one a natural disaster 
and one a public relations crisis), two different outlooks (one a regional response, one an 
international awareness mission), with two very different causes (the “why”), and finally, 
two very different resources from which to draw.  However, these variables, 
acknowledged and taken into account, do not undermine the juxtaposition of how each 
organization dealt with crisis—one with pre-planning and strategy and one without.  This 
comparative analysis provides a useful and stark contrast demonstrating the hazard in a 
cause (the “why”) without solid guiding strategy (the “how”).   
Openness and honesty are critical.  Passion capital must be guided, stewarded and 
managed—volunteers at CRC were given clear indications of what to expect in their 
training; sometimes CRC volunteers will be asked to take out the trash or sweep the 
cafeteria in the disaster shelters—the volunteers know that a disaster response often 
requires less glamorous assignments.  Bandwagon jumpers are often disguised as true 
believers.  When CRC volunteers discover in their training that the role may require more 
than the picturesque ideal of wrapping blankets around displaced persons, those without 
the passion and belief in the cause tend to be weeded out.  Invisible Children fostered 
resentment from those who had supported the cause when the tide of public opinion 
began to turn.  They felt as though Russell was unable to deal with the criticisms and 
inarticulately defended the cause, which led to mass abandonment.  Invisible Children’s 
“why” had been oversimplified without readily available information relating to the 
nuances of the situation in central Africa and the limitations of Invisible Children’s 
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mission, and Russell was crucified for it.   To manage the “why,” passion capital and the 
true believers, and to create new true believers, strategy and honesty are key. 
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 Chapter Three: The Elements of Crisis Leadership in Practice 
Application of the Theoretical Framework in Atlantic Canada 
Having reviewed the theoretical framework of both modern day organizational 
crises as well as good leadership in critical situations, testing these frameworks in real 
scenarios will demonstrate these truths wholly and in practice.  The first case study to be 
applied will be the IWK case initially discussed in the Introduction.  The case will be 
looked at in its entirety, first testing it against the elements used to identify a crisis then 
examined to identify the elements of good leadership in crisis.   
IWK Case Study  
 When Rehtaeh Parson’s father went to the media on Friday June 7th, 2013 alleging 
that his daughter had been strip searched by two male staff at 4 South (the IWK’s mental 
health inpatient unit), the IWK was thrown into crisis.  Rather than remaining silent when 
media placed calls for comment from the IWK that would appear alongside Mr. 
Canning’s comments, the IWK (via CEO Anne McGuire) released a generic statement 
regarding strip search policy:  
Clothes are removed from patients if they are clinically assessed at a severely 
high risk to use their clothing to harm themselves…These types of situations 
are extremely rare due to our precautionary actions to provide a safe 
environment. However, in these circumstances, the gender of the care 
provider is of less relevance than the consequences of not acting quickly 
(Hoare, 2013). 
 
McGuire waited until the article came out before commenting on anything specifically 
relating to Rehtaeh.  Then, the IWK took what appears to be a dual-pronged strategy.  
First, to avoid shaking the public’s confidence in the IWK, McGuire officially denied the 
allegations.  Secondly, and arguably most importantly, in an effort to demonstrate respect 
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for an IWK patient and her grieving parents McGuire stated that Rehtaeh would not be 
well served by continuing the dialogue in public, stating: “We will reach out to Rehtaeh’s 
family to hear and discuss their concerns directly with them" (Willick, 2013).  This 
strategy was very much in line with the hospital-wide policy of patient privacy, legally 
binding patient confidentiality rules and the ingrained culture of respect for patients and 
inclusion (as far as is appropriate) of patient families in patient care. 
Next, the IWK took four actions to mitigate the crisis: 
i) McGuire provided Mr. Canning and Leah Parsons (Rehtaeh’s mother) 
with medical records and reviews relating to their daughter’s care and 
treatment at the IWK, personally reviewing the documents with them, 
whilst publically sticking to the messaging about official strip search 
policy.  In a portion of the record released by Mr. Canning on his blog, it 
is indicated that Rehtaeh was not in fact strip searched by males, but that 
a “security presence was required,” thus indicating there were males 
present although not directly involved in the actual removal of any 
clothing (Canning, 2013).  
ii) The IWK Foundation was kept in the loop on the media releases coming 
from the IWK Health Centre and Foundation staff was provided copies 
of press releases to address any questions internally and ensure both 
entities were on the same page when questioned to avoid misinformation 
on a sensitive topic.  All questions from the public to the Foundation 
were to be transferred to the Foundation marketing team.  From there, 
any questions beyond the basic messaging were to be channelled to the 
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IWK public relations team.  Above all, respect for Rehtaeh and her 
loved ones was priority. 
iii) Ahead of the upcoming AGM of the Foundation, at which a major donor 
was going to announce a $1 million contribution to the construction of a 
new mental health unit, Gillivan informed the donor that there could be 
media and negative attention directed at the event.  The donor was given 
the option to withdraw from the announcement.  The donor decided to 
go ahead with the announcement, but was appreciative of the cautionary 
guidance provided to her and the option to withdraw.  This was truly 
donor-centered, placing the donor first.   
iv) The IWK publically agreed to work with a provincially appointed 
independent expert, Dr. Jane Davidson, who had been commissioned to 
review practices at the IWK and Capital Health hospitals across the 
region (Canadian Press, 2013).  
What was the outcome of this crisis from the organizational perspective?  What 
was the process that led to this outcome?  First, it must be tested to ensure that the event 
was indeed a crisis rather than a problem:  
Table  3.1: Identifying Crises: The IWK Case Study 
Criteria of a Crisis Present Comments  
 Impact is of a high 
magnitude/significant?  
Made local and international news, casting 
uncommonly widespread and intense 
spotlight on the IWK and its role in the 
situation.  
Is there a need for immediate 
attention?  
A response was pertinent, not only to address 
the wider public, but to address concerned 
parents of patients in the unit and also 
acknowledge the pain and frustrations of 




The Foundation had donors who had given 
to the unit’s redevelopment and needed to 
receive accurate and immediate information 
for donor accountability.   
Is there an element of 
surprise/rarity?  
The article featuring Mr. Canning criticizing 
the IWK was unexpected and came with less 
than one day’s warning.  The public relations 
team at the IWK received a request for 
comment prior to the article’s release, as far 
as is known via available open source 
information.   
 
While the mental healthcare system in Nova 
Scotia had been the subject of scrutiny 
before, resulting in a commissioned report, 
this was the first time the IWK had been 
specifically singled out and criticized for 
procedures within this unit (Davidson & 
Coniglio, 2013).  
Is there a need to take action? 
 
The seriousness of the accusations alongside 
the timing regarding fundraising efforts 
towards a new unit required immediate 
action and collaboration with IWK, the 
Foundation, Rehtaeh’s family and the 
government in order to find a respectful and 
meaningful resolution. 
Is the event of a nature that is 
outside the organization’s 
complete control? 
 
The right of Mr. Canning to speak out about 
the care and treatment of his daughter and 
his perception of that care is outside the 
control of the IWK. 
Does it affect multiple 
stakeholders (internal and 
external)? 
 
The criticisms of the IWK affected: 
• Parents/patients 
• IWK staff  
• IWK senior management 
• IWK Foundation donors 
• IWK Foundation staff 
• Broader community who relies on the 
IWK for healthcare services, 
particularly those utilizing youth 
mental health services. 
 
As illustrated in Table 3.2, the IWK was experiencing a crisis that originated from 
an external source.  The crisis was a faux pas in that the IWK had unintentionally left the 
parents of a former patient feeling like the care their daughter received was careless if not 
40 
 
harmful to her rather than beneficial.  The IWK had upset Rehtaeh’s parents, but without 
intent; a large part of this crisis stems from the lack of information Rehtaeh’s parents had 
about their daughter’s stay at the IWK.  Given that there are no indicators that Mr. 
Canning was going to go to the media with his complaint, it is unlikely that this crisis 
could have been avoided.  Freedom of speech ensures public dialogue, which can 
sometimes throw organizations into crisis.  In bringing her family in to review the 
records, the IWK moved to alleviate concerns and facilitate understanding with full 
disclosure—albeit restricted to the parents out of respect for the patient and her right to 
privacy, even posthumously.    












 Table 3.3 demonstrates the steps taken across the IWK organization from pre-
crisis to post-crisis.    
Table 3.3: Process Management: The IWK Case Study 
I. Signal Detection: Early 
warnings of pending 
crisis/weaknesses 
Rehtaeh stayed at the IWK in March and 
had attempted to take her own life in April.  
Her father addressed his concerns with the 
IWK and her care in June.  The early 
signals of discontent are not immediately 
clear based on available open source 
information.   
II. Preparation/Prevention: Crisis 
planning, risk management 
Ahead of the release of Mr. Canning’s 
comments, the IWK public relations team 
began to review mental health inpatient 
unit policies and processes, reviewing these 
with McGuire prior to her making a 
comment.  The Foundation was looped into 
communications as necessary and 
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centralized messaging came from the CEO 
of the IWK. 
III. Containment/Mitigation: 
Proactive, reactive response as 
crisis unfolds 
 
The IWK avoided separate messaging from 
the mental health unit’s staff, the IWK 
administration and the Foundation.   
 
As the situation unfolded, the messaging 
remained the same, but the IWK was 
adaptable, agreeing to work with the 
government commission, meet Rehtaeh’s 
family and work with the Foundation to 
ensure coordination and provide all parties 
with accurate information as required.   
 
Critically, Mr. Canning and Ms. Parsons 
were not cast as the ‘enemy’ attacking the 
local children’s hospital, but as parents that 
required full information in a manner that 
would respect the privacy of the patient.  
This contained further potential damage by 
moving the crisis to a more private 
environment. 
IV. Recovery: Return to normal or 
“new” normal, short and long 
term recovery initiatives 
 
With the records of the patient’s treatment 
at the IWK, the criticisms devolved from 
specific condemnation of the IWK to a 
broader discussion of youth mental health 
and cyber bullying in the province.  The 
IWK offered full cooperation with the 
government commission in part as a result 
of the public discourse Rehtaeh’s death 
caused.   
V. Learning: Collating, analyzing 
and acting on lessons learned, 
best practices 
 
Resulting from the review of Rehtaeh’s 
records and the IWK’s cooperation with the 
government commission, the IWK along 
with other providers of mental health 
services would work to implement 
“trauma-informed care (TIC),” which 
strives to identify and avoid triggers that 
may stimulate further trauma for patients as 
well as facilitate a more integrated 
approach to mental health services and 
programs by including the education, social 
programs and the justice system in 
treatment and follow up procedures 




Rehtaeh’s family was given the opportunity 
to review the report before it was released.  
As a result, they were included in the 
solution and felt positive progress was 
emerging from a tragic event (Canning, 
2013).  This reinforced the mission of the 
IWK to incorporate as much of the family 
as appropriate in patient care (Davidson & 
Coniglio, 2013).  
 
 Table 3.4 demonstrates the presence of transformational leadership.  What is clear 
in this case study is that although transformational leadership is often viewed as an 
internal form of currency employed by management, transformational leadership can also 
have a positive impact on external stakeholders.   
Table 3.4: Elements of Transformational Leadership: The IWK Case Study  
Element Applicable Evidence 
Idealized Influence 
- Leading by example 
- Clear communication 
- Demonstrate knowledge of 
situation  
 Clear communication was 
demonstrated throughout, with all 
internal parties remaining on message.  
 
McGuire appears to have been fully 
briefed on the situation and the 
relevant policies.  
 
Family-centered care was employed by 
bringing in Rehtaeh’s parents for 
further discussion. 
Inspirational Motivation 
- Foster commitment 
through symbolism 
- Communication and the 
development of 
interpersonal connections 
- Capable of earning and 
retaining the good faith 
and confidence of 
followers in the 
organization’s vision 
ultimately leading to a 
united force 
 In extending an offer to Rehtaeh’s 
family to come in and review the 
official records, the IWK reinforced 
the notion of family-centered care.   
 
The Foundation symbolized the 
importance of putting the donor first, 
in offering the $1 million donor the 
option to back out of the public 
announcement.  This also 
demonstrated interpersonal 
relationship development which served 
to retain the good faith of the donor. 
Intellectual Stimulation 
- Consistently asking 
 While the situation in and of itself was 
challenging to the internal parties, the 
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employees to exceed the 
status quo 
- Knowledge of the terrain 
and the organization’s 
direction 
CEOs of the IWK and the Foundation 
maintained composure and internal 
communication throughout the crisis to 
ensure a united front and access to 
accurate information to ensure 
consistency. 
Individualized Consideration 
- Paying attention to the 
personal/professional 
needs much as is practical  
- Maintain a fair balance 
between discipline and 
compassion  
 The IWK worked well with the 
Foundation to ensure the Foundation 
had accurate information and 
consistent messaging when addressing 
concerned donors.   
 
McGuire maintained a delicate balance 
between patient confidentiality and the 
sensitive nature of the tragic loss 
Rehtaeh’s parents were dealing with.   
Strategy 
• Oversee knowledge-based 





The strategy employed by the IWK 
remained tethered to the core vision of 
the IWK: patient privacy, legally 
binding patient confidentiality rules 
and the ingrained culture of respect for 
patients and inclusion (as far as is 
appropriate) of patient families. 
 
The Leadership Triumvirate in Action 
 
When dealing with the crisis, the IWK did not reinvent the wheel.  Rather, what 
happened in this instance is that the public relations team jumped into action, the CEO 
was briefed on in-unit practices and policy, and kept messaging respectful and matter-of-
fact by addressing policy rather than individuals.  Although patient confidentiality is 
pivotal in the Canadian healthcare system, the IWK took steps towards reasonable 
disclosure by inviting Mr. Canning and Ms. Parsons to review Rehtaeh’s stay but protect 
the confidentiality of the medical staff involved (Tutton, 2013).  In meeting with 
Rehtaeh’s parents, the IWK removed the dialogue from the public forum.  It should be 
noted that physicians are expected “to act in accordance with all legal requirements, but 
must also use their best judgment to practice medicine in a safe and humane manner...and 
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act with sensitivity” and that a request can be made to review the IWK’s decisions or 
actions by a Provincial Review Officer (IWK Health Centre, 2014).  The IWK’s “why” 
is family-centered care.  By inviting Mr. Canning and Ms. Parsons in to discuss 
Rehtaeh’s treatment, the IWK demonstrated consistency with a key tenet of the hospital’s 
core values in a way that would also provide Rehtaeh’s family with answers and, 
hopefully, a bit of peace.    
In providing the $1 million donor with the option to back out of the public 
announcement regarding the donation towards mental health at the IWK, the Foundation 
reinforced the donor’s will to go public—this is a clear example of stewarding, respecting 
and cultivating a “true believer.”  Finally, the joint efforts of the IWK and the 
Foundation provided the support and information required for empowered action by staff 
to reassure patients, patient families, donors and the general public.  The concentrated 
efforts, messaging tethered to core values, and the flexibility in the response created a 
sustainable solution to see the crisis through to its end.  Indeed, the belief in the core 
values and the concentrated execution of the crisis management strategy demonstrated 
sustained passion capital at the IWK and the Foundation (Passion Capital = Energy + 
Intensity + Sustainability).  Perhaps most importantly, Rehtaeh’s friends and family felt 
positive progress in the learnings of the study the IWK participated in and the 
implementation of TIC, resulting in a tangible benefit born of a tragic situation.   
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Chapter Four: Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
Making the Links 
In each case study outlined in Chapter Three, the organization acknowledges the 
crisis at the highest level of management.  Strengths are concentrated in existing areas of 
the organization, with expertise brought in as necessary, if at all.  Communications are 
centralized and consistent, coming from the CEO to symbolize organizational unity and 
the gravity with which the organization views the situation.  When the organization sees 
an opportunity to remedy the situation, as McGuire did in bringing in Rehtaeh’s parents 
to review the medical records, action was taken swiftly.  The confidence of employees is 
rallied behind the organization by the CEO through their commitment to and 
understanding of the organization’s “why” and the crisis is lessened into something 
manageable.  Throughout both case studies, the applicable theoretical frameworks are 
apparent, ultimately highlighting the importance of good leadership and sound crisis 
planning.   
Removed from real world examples, how are transformational leadership and the 
leadership triumvirate related?  What role does strategy play in linking these two 
concepts?  What does this look like in times of crisis?  In integrating these theories, a 
simple but effective way to view them as an integrated model is to view crisis as a 
journey—a road trip if you will—with the CEO at the helm, driving the organization 
forward.  The road is the strategy, pinpointing the destination and mapping how the 
organization is going to get there.  Transformational leaders and the key elements 
comprising transformational leadership are born of the leadership triumvirate; the 
leadership triumvirate is the fuel that makes transformational leadership possible and 
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Figure 3: Key Elements of the Crisis Journey 
 
impactful for employees.  With the 
leadership triumvirate propelling the 
transformational leader forward, 
employees perform their roles with 
passion and a true belief in the 
raison d’être of the organization (the 
“why”).  Employee loyalty is 
critical; they are on the frontline of 
the journey where the wheels hit the pavement.  They are the internal mechanisms that 
ensure the engine is functioning and running smoothly.  Communication between the 
leader and the employees is critical.  If the leader spots a bump in the road ahead that may 
take the organization off course, honesty and consistent communication will be key.  In 
addition, if one of the employees signals a weakness within the organization or comes 
across a bump in the road, senior management must be willing to listen, investigate and 
make a decision to act if needed. 
 
Recommendations 
From the aforementioned case studies and previous discussion of the relevant 
theories, the following recommendations can be made for organizations in crisis: 
• Understand that not every situation is a crisis.  Some situations are problems that 
the organization has dealt with before, only with different variables and players.  
• The CEO should always keep a pulse on the financial health of the organization, 
the vitality of the mission and vision, and, the relational aspects of the workplace, 
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including setting the tone for the organization’s culture.  This is true in a crisis 
and after a crisis.  
• It is key to understand that reinventing the wheel is not an inherent, necessary or 
beneficial management practice in crisis. 
• Understanding the type of crisis (internal or external, intentional or accidental) is 
critical in determining the next steps.  If the organization has erred, either 
intentionally or not, it is critical to acknowledge any responsibility.  Swift action 
towards remedy is critical to mitigating damage and reducing the duration of the 
crisis.  This is true whether the crisis is a direct result of action (intentional or 
accidental) taken by the organization or an external party.   
• There is a process for crisis leadership.  Not always linear, these steps lead to 
outcomes that enable learning for future situations.   
• The evolution of leadership studies has led academics and practitioners to regard 
transformational leadership as an ideal for leaders of organizations.  The case 
study and examples have demonstrated this to be true of leaders in crisis as well.   
• There are different ways in which a leader can demonstrate transformational 
leadership, and different elements of transformational leadership are more 
important than others based on the organizational culture and situational factors.  
• The leadership triumvirate is critical for internal and external audiences, yet, it is 
only as strong as the strategy.  A key element to strategy is understanding the 
“why.”  A key element to executing the strategy is the presence of true believers 
with passion capital, from front line employees up to and including the CEO.  
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